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PICKING UP THE REMNANTS POST-
WALLER: PROPERLY LIMITING THE 
SCOPE OF UNECONOMIC REMNANT 
CLAIMS IN WISCONSIN EMINENT 
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 
Statutory interpretation often requires a court to review the legislative 
intent behind the statute.  However, this task is not always easily 
undertaken when the intent of the legislature is itself unclear.  A recent 
Wisconsin Supreme Court case illustrates the difficulty in properly 
interpreting arguably ambiguous statutory language.  Nevertheless, this 
Comment hopes to demonstrate that by examining the history of remnant 
theory, it should be clear that uneconomic remnant claims in eminent 
domain proceedings were intended to be limited to situations where the 
partial taking creates either a physical remnant or a financial remnant.  
Furthermore, this Comment argues that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
recent interpretation of Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute has 
created a hybrid remnant claim that may burden public utility companies 
and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation in initiating eminent 
domain proceedings if the statute is not adequately modified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
require that the government pay just compensation for the taking of 
private property for public use.1  Despite this requirement, state and 
local municipalities have on occasion successfully argued that they 
should be permitted to condemn more land than is physically necessary 
for a public improvement under the principle of “excess 
condemnation.”2  However, what happens when the landowner argues 
not that the government is condemning too much land, but that the 
government is condemning too little?3  Can the landowner force the 
government to take more land than it needs for a public works project?  
What if the government desires to condemn only easements?  Can the 
 
1.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Chicago, Burlington & Qunicy R.R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
2.  Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity and Excess Condemnation Under 
Eminent Domain, 38 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 305 (2009).  Excess condemnation does not mean 
the taking of land beyond what is legally permitted but instead means the taking of land in 
excess of the area specifically needed to construct the public project.  Gary P. Johnson, 
Comment, The Effect of the Public Use Requirement on Excess Condemnation, 48 TENN. L. 
REV. 370, 370 n.1 (1981).  As Part II.A will discuss in more detail, remnant theory is the 
theory that the government has most successfully advanced to justify excess condemnation.  
However, this Comment focuses on the reverse scenario, where a landowner brings an 
uneconomic remnant claim in order to require an agency exercising its eminent domain 
power to acquire more land than is necessary for the project. 
3.  See Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶ 26, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 
764.  Justice Prosser, writing for the majority, summarized the Wallers’ complaint in this 
manner: “In short, the Wallers did not argue that the ATC was taking too much, but that 
ATC was trying to get away with taking too little.”  Id. 
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landowner force the government to take fee simple title to the entire 
property? 
A recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Waller v. American 
Transmission Co., held that under Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant 
statute,4 a landowner may compel a public utility company that has 
government authorization to condemn only easements for high-voltage 
transmission lines to take fee simple title to the entire property.5  While 
the public utility company did not need to condemn the entire property 
for the project, the landowners successfully argued that as a result of the 
condemnation, they were left with a property that was of “substantially 
impaired economic viability” and was therefore an uneconomic 
remnant.6  Wisconsin appears to be the first state to find that an 
easement condemnation, other than for a permanent highway easement, 
has created an uneconomic remnant.7  Likewise, Waller appears to be 
the first case nationwide where a landowner has successfully brought an 
uneconomic remnant claim requiring the condemnor to take fee simple 
 
4.  See WIS. STAT. § 32.05(3m) (2011–2012); id. § 32.06(3m).  These two statutory 
provisions are identical, but the duplicity is necessary because condemnation proceedings are 
divided into two categories in Wisconsin.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 56.  Wisconsin Statutes 
section 32.05 is a “quick-take” statute for condemning property for sewer and transportation 
projects.  Id. ¶ 57.  Section 32.06 is a “slow-take” statute, which covers any other 
condemnations, including high-voltage transmission line easement condemnations.  Id. ¶¶ 1–
2, 57.  In this Comment, all references to the Wisconsin Statutes as discussed by the court in 
Waller are cited to the 2011–2012 version; however, the statute has not changed in the 
publication of the 2013–2014 Wisconsin Statutes. 
5.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77. 
6.  Id. ¶ 119. 
7.  Very few courts have even considered uneconomic remnant claims in easement cases 
other than for a permanent highway easement, and none have found that an uneconomic 
remnant exists.  See Hendricks v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 143, 147, 154 (1987) (flowage 
easements); Nelson Drainage Dist. v. Filippis, 436 N.W.2d 682, 683, 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
(box drain easement), abrogated on other grounds by City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children’s 
Funded Trust, 701 N.W.2d 144, 149 n.4 (Mich. 2005); City of Lake Oswego v. Babson, 776 
P.2d 870, 871, 873 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (drainage easements).  A non-precedential Wisconsin 
case following the first court of appeals decision in Waller, 2009 WI App 172, ¶ 17, 322 Wis. 
2d 255, 776 N.W.2d 612, indicated that a permanent limited easement for a driveway access 
may leave a landowner with an uneconomic remnant.  See Husar v. City of Brookfield, Nos. 
2009AP326, 2009AP327, ¶¶ 1, 3, 327 Wis. 2d 797, 788 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 
2010) (unpublished table decision).  This case in itself helps demonstrate the potential impact 
of the Waller precedent on Wisconsin eminent domain proceedings.  See id. ¶ 13; cf. Winkel v. 
Miller, 205 P.3d 688, 691, 694, 696 (Kan. 2009) (holding that the Kansas Department of 
Transportation was permitted to acquire a permanent easement for an asphalt mixing strip 
without taking fee simple title to the entire property, and any decrease in value to the 
remainder was appropriately remedied in the form of severance damages).  
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title to the entire property when the property was not fragmented into 
multiple parcels.8 
This Comment argues that, based on the history of remnant theory, 
the scope of uneconomic remnant claims was intended to be limited to 
either “physical” or “financial” remnants and that the definitions of each 
should not be combined as one inquiry.  However, in Wisconsin, a 
combination of questionable statutory construction of Wisconsin 
Statutes section 32.06(3m), a unique set of facts in the Waller case, and 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s apparent failure to recognize the 
difference between the physical and financial remnant inquiries has 
resulted in a confusing and undesirable hybrid remnant.  Nevertheless, 
three modifications to Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute could 
greatly diminish the adverse impact of Waller, especially in regard to 
easement condemnation proceedings for high-voltage transmission and 
natural gas lines, as well as some highway projects.  These modifications 
include limiting uneconomic remnants to physical remnants and 
financial remnants, providing severance damages as the remedy for 
devaluation of property where neither type of remnant is created, and 
relying on a valuation proceeding to validate whether a physical or 
financial remnant exists. 
Part II of this Comment traces the history of remnant theory in the 
context of excess takings, highlights early case law that created different 
types of remnants, and explores the codification of remnant theory, 
including the enactment of Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute in 
1977.  Part III introduces the Waller case and discusses the key issues 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had to wrestle with in interpreting 
Wisconsin Statutes section 32.06(3m).  Part IV focuses on the Waller 
 
8.  Very few cases have even afforded a landowner the right to successfully bring an 
uneconomic remnant claim, and each has involved a property that was severed in two or more 
parcels following the condemnation.  See State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 404 A.2d 29, 30, 32 
(N.J. 1979); Twp. of Wayne v. Kosoff, 372 A.2d 289, 291, 294 (N.J. 1977); Comm’r of 
Highways v. W. Dulles Props., L.L.C., 86 Va. Cir. 284, 284, 289 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2013); W. Va. 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Dodson Mobile Homes Sales & Servs., Inc., 624 S.E.2d 468, 470–71, 473 
(W. Va. 2005).  West Virginia’s highest state court resolved the issue of attorneys’ fees when a 
landowner successfully brings a counterclaim for an uneconomic remnant in an inverse 
condemnation proceeding.  Dodson Mobile Homes, 624 S.E.2d at 474.  Although the 
landowner’s right to bring an uneconomic remnant claim was not specifically at issue, this 
case was the most recent, prior to Waller, in which a state supreme court has required the 
state to take fee simple title to an entire property in a partial taking because the landowner 
was left with an uneconomic remnant.  See id. at 473.  However, unlike Waller, the highway 
project severed the landowner’s parcel in two, and the state did not dispute the jury verdict 
that the landowner’s property was an uneconomic remnant.  Id. at 470–71. 
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court’s interpretation of the phrase “substantially impaired economic 
viability” in section 32.06(3m).  This Part explains why even though the 
phrase was prone to misinterpretation, the court’s interpretation has 
created a new hybrid remnant that combines the inquiry for physical 
remnants with the inquiry for financial remnants. 
Part V focuses on another key aspect of the Waller decision—the 
circumstances in which an uneconomic remnant claim is appropriate.  
This Part asserts that, while allowing a landowner to bring an 
uneconomic remnant claim properly reflects legislative intent, an 
uneconomic remnant should be found to exist only if the remainder 
after a partial taking is a physical remnant or financial remnant.  
Additionally, Part V explains why the proper remedy for devaluation of 
property when the easement condemnation creates neither type of 
remnant is severance damages.  Finally, Part VI summarizes the 
significance of Waller and proposes three key modifications to 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute, which should prevent 
unwarranted uneconomic remnant claims by either a landowner or the 
condemning agency in circumstances where it is clear that neither a 
physical remnant nor a financial remnant exists.9  Properly limiting the 
scope of uneconomic remnant claims will ensure that the public good is 
promoted by diminishing the administrative and financial burden on 
Wisconsin public utility companies and the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation in initiating eminent domain proceedings.  
II. HISTORY OF REMNANT THEORY AND STATUTORY ENACTMENTS 
Understanding the broader history of remnant theory is critical to 
recognizing the purpose behind Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant 
statute and the type of circumstances where an uneconomic remnant 
claim is appropriate.  This history includes early remnant theory case 
law in the context of excess takings, and the enactment of uneconomic 
remnant statutes, including Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute in 
 
9.  It is beyond the scope of this Comment whether financial remnant theory should be 
considered a proper exercise of eminent domain power or whether remnant theory should 
instead be confined to physical remnants, as is the case under some state statutes.  See infra 
notes 27, 38 and accompanying text.  Instead, this Comment will argue that the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Waller interpreted “substantially impaired economic viability” to refer to 
language regarding financial remnants but then applied it as a broader version of physical 
remnants when the Waller property was neither a physical remnant nor a financial remnant.  
Therefore, Waller has created a confusing hybrid remnant, which could impact certain 
eminent domain proceedings in Wisconsin if the state’s uneconomic remnant statute is not 
modified.  
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1977.  Because section 32.06(3m) was based on a model statute, and the 
model statute was based on federal legislation, this Part will introduce 
each statutory enactment in order to properly interpret the legislative 
history behind Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute.  
A. Excess Condemnation and Remnant Theory 
In order to understand the history of remnant theory, one must first 
recognize that remnant theory has traditionally fallen under the broader 
concept of excess condemnation.10  Excess condemnation occurs when 
the government uses its power of eminent domain to acquire more land 
than is absolutely necessary for a public improvement.11  Originally, 
courts were reluctant to sanction a condemnation of property that was 
not specifically needed for the public project.12  Furthermore, federal 
and state constitutions require that property taken through eminent 
domain be taken only for a public use.13  However, as the concept of 
public use expanded, excess condemnation became more and more 
acceptable.14  Thus, the question of “what is a public use?” became the 
critical factor for excess condemnation, with courts determining that this 
question is “judicial in nature.”15  Courts began to accept the argument 
that the condemnation of land in excess of what was needed for the 
public improvement was nevertheless needed to accomplish the public 
use or benefit, as long as a statute expressly authorized this excess 
condemnation.16   
 
10.  Bird & Oswald, supra note 2, at 306; Johnson, supra note 2, at 382; Thomas F. 
Nelson, Note, An Expanded Use of Excess Condemnation, 21 U. PITT. L. REV. 60, 62 (1959); 
see also ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN, EXCESS CONDEMNATION 24 (1917).   
11.  2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.06[6][a] (3d ed. 2014); see also Cincinnati v. 
Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 441 (1930); CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
12.  See, e.g., Gregg v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 56 Md. 256, 272 (1881); In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 91 N.E. 405, 406–07 (Mass. 1910); In re Albany St., 11 Wend. 149, 149 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 88 A. 904, 908 (Pa. 1913); 
see also Comment, Public Land Ownership, 52 YALE L.J. 634, 650 (1943). 
13.  Johnson, supra note 2, at 370; see also, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“The property 
of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.”); supra note 1 
and accompanying text. 
14.  John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1435 
(1974); Nelson, supra note 10, at 69–70. 
15.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][a]; see also People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. 
Superior Court, 436 P.2d 342, 348 (Cal. 1968) (“The issue of whether a taking is for a public 
use, however, is justiciable.”). 
16.  Bird & Oswald, supra note 2, at 305; Johnson, supra note 2, at 379; see also, e.g., 
Kern Cnty. Union High Sch. Dist. v. McDonald, 179 P. 180, 184 (Cal. 1919); Forest Pres. Dist. 
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Government authorities typically have justified the taking of land in 
excess of what is needed under three theories: remnant theory, 
protective theory, and recoupment theory.17  Remnant theory, which is 
the focus of this Comment, was the first theory to justify excess 
condemnation and is the most widely accepted theory.18  Remnant 
theory was originally limited to physical remnants.19  However, some 
courts judicially expanded remnant theory to include financial remnants 
and economic remnants.20  While it is important to understand the 
difference between each type of remnant, this Comment will ultimately 
focus on physical and financial remnants in the context of interpreting 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute.21   
B. Types of Remnants 
Remnant theory was originally developed to address physical 
remnants,22 and it appears to have developed out of dicta from early 
twentieth century case law.23  A physical remnant is created “when the 
remainder of a condemned parcel is left in such a condition that it will 
be of little value to the owner.”24  In other words, physical remnant 
theory authorizes excess condemnation when “the fraction remaining 
after a taking of part of a parcel of land is so small and of such shape 
 
of Cook Cnty. v. Wike, 119 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ill. 1954); City of Tulsa v. Williams, 227 P. 876, 
880 (Okla. 1924). 
17.  Bird & Oswald, supra note 2, at 305–06.  Protective theory is a theory under which 
excess land is justified in order to protect the land surrounding the public improvement.  
NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][c][i].  Recoupment theory is a theory under which the 
government may finance a public project by condemning excess land and then selling it at a 
surplus because the project enhances its value.  Id. § 7.06[6][d].  These two theories are not 
relevant to the discussion of this Comment. 
18.  Bird & Oswald, supra note 2, at 304, 306. 
19.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][i]. 
20.  Id.; see also Pub. Works, 436 P.2d at 346 (expanding remnant theory to include 
financial remnants); State v. Buck, 226 A.2d 840, 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) 
(expanding remnant theory to include economic remnants).  
21.  See infra Part IV. 
22.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][i]. 
23.  Nelson, supra note 10, at 62 & n.14 (describing early case law that implied or 
referenced the authorization of remnant theory); see also, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 
F.2d 242, 243–44 (6th Cir. 1929), aff’d, 281 U.S. 439 (1930); Excelsior Needle Co. v. City of 
Springfield, 108 N.E. 497, 497 (Mass. 1915); Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 102 N.E. 619, 621 (Mass. 1913); In re Opinion of the Justices, 91 N.E. 578, 
580 (Mass. 1910); see also E.L. Strobin, Annotation, Right to Condemn Property in Excess of 
Needs for a Particular Public Purpose, 6 A.L.R.3d 297, § 6[d] (1966). 
24.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][ii]. 
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that it is separately of negligible value.”25  Physical remnant theory has 
often been advanced in highway condemnation projects where the 
creation or widening of a public road or highway would sever a parcel of 
land and leave small fragments of land, which were of little value to the 
landowner.26  State statutes authorizing excess condemnation under 
remnant theory—at the very least—authorize the acquisition of physical 
remnants.27   
A financial remnant exists when the severance damages for the 
remaining portion, after a partial taking, would equal the value of 
condemning the entire property.28  The California Supreme Court was 
the first court to adopt financial remnant theory as a valid exercise of 
eminent domain power.29  In People ex rel. Department of Public Works 
v. Superior Court, the California Department of Public Works 
condemned 0.65 acres of a landowner’s property to build a freeway.30  
Additionally, the state sought to condemn the remaining fifty-four acre 
parcel, which would be landlocked after the construction of the 
highway.31  The landowners challenged the condemnation of the fifty-
four acre property and demanded severance damages instead.32  
However, the court determined that although the fifty-four acre parcel 
 
25.  Nelson, supra note 10, at 62. 
26.  CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 25 (discussing highway projects that leave fragments of 
land that are not usable); Paul C. Droz, Eminent Domain for Highway Purposes—Limitations 
on Excess Condemnation, 6 UTAH B.J. 34, 34 (1978). 
27.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(9) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 113-
5(9) (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.54(8) (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23, § 154-C (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-37-3(i) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-7(a) (2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.59(K) (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 13(9) 
(West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-118(a) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.26.180(9) 
(West 2007). 
28.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][iv]. 
29.  See People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Superior Court, 436 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1968); 
see also Johnson, supra note 2, at 386 (discussing that the California Supreme Court created 
financial remnant theory in Public Works). 
30.  Pub. Works, 436 P.2d at 343. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 344.  The landowners sought a remedy of severance damages so that they 
could retain title to the property even though the severance damages might have been equal 
to the fair market value of the entire property.  Id.  They argued that excess condemnation of 
the landlocked parcel to avoid paying excessive severance damages was not a taking for a 
public use.  Id.  
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was not a physical remnant, it was a financial remnant.33  The court held 
that as long as the state could prove that taking the portion of the land 
not needed for the public improvement would prevent the state from 
paying excessive severance or consequential damages, then the excess 
condemnation met the public use requirement and was, therefore, a 
constitutional taking.34   
Excessive severance damages become a factor only when the 
condemnor would be required to pay for the whole property while only 
receiving a part.35  Thus, the determining factor in whether the 
government can take excess land under financial remnant theory is the 
amount of compensation that would be required to be paid in severance 
damages.36  While “[f]inancial remnant theory has become more 
acceptable as the meaning of public use has expanded,”37 not all state 
statutes that authorize the acquisition of physical remnants support 
financial remnant theory.38  However, the model statute on which 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute was based explicitly 
authorized the condemnation of both physical and financial remnants.39 
An economic remnant is created when the cost to acquire the entire 
property is only a little more than the cost to acquire the portion 
 
33.  Id. at 346.  The court held that “[t]here is no reason to restrict [remnant] theory to 
the taking of parcels negligible in size and to refuse to apply it to parcels negligible in 
value.”  Id. 
34.  Id. at 344–45. 
35.  Droz, supra note 26, at 44; see also NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][iv]. 
36.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][iv]. 
37.  Id.  For states adopting language from section 208 of the Model Eminent Domain 
Code regarding financial remnants, see, for example, Alabama Eminent Domain Code, Act 
No. 85-548, § 208, 1985 Ala. Acts 802, 806 (codified at ALA. CODE § 18-1A-27 (LexisNexis 
2007)); Eminent Domain Procedure Act, No. 173, sec. 1, § 28-2-100, 1987 S.C. Acts 2074, 2082 
(codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-100 (2007)).  For states authorizing the acquisition of land 
in excess of what is needed for the condemnation project to avoid paying severance damages 
that equal the cost of acquiring the entire parcel, see Act of Apr. 14, 1960, ch. 122, § 3, 1960 
Alaska Sess. Laws 172, 173 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 35.20.030 (2012)); Act 
of May 19, 1998, ch. 126, § 2, 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 775, 775 (codified as amended at ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-7092(C) (2013)); Act of May 10, 1967, ch. 56, § 2, 1967 Neb. Laws 191, 
192 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT § 15-229.01 (2012)); Act of Mar. 9, 1961, ch. 145, 
§ 1, 1961 S.D. Sess. Laws. 161, 161 (codified as amended at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31-19-42 
(2004 & Supp. 2013)); Act of Mar. 9, 1963, ch. 160, art. 1, § 18, 1963 W. Va. Acts. 760, 768–69 
(codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-2A-18 (LexisNexis 2013)). 
38.  See supra note 27 for a non-exhaustive list of state statutes that do not authorize the 
taking of the excess portion of a property in a partial taking in order to avoid paying excessive 
severance damages.  
39.  See MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974); see also 
id. § 208 cmt. 
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needed.40  Economic remnant theory has been authorized under a few 
state statutes to allow a condemnor to take an entire parcel of land 
when it is economically advantageous to the condemnor to take the 
remaining portion after a partial taking.41  In State v. Buck, a New Jersey 
court held that “when, as here, the value of the whole is little more than 
the value of the major part, it is sound business judgment and in the 
public interest to take the entire parcel.”42  For purposes of this 
Comment, only physical remnants and financial remnants will be 
discussed because Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute does not 
refer to economic remnants and the model statute on which it was based 
applied only to physical remnants and financial remnants.43   
C. Codification of Remnant Theory 
Remnant theory in its “strictest view” was essentially a “de 
minimus” rule to justify excess condemnation.44  However, as late as the 
1960s, very few statutes explicitly authorized excess condemnation 
under remnant theory.45  Nevertheless, there were no cases that 
suggested that condemning excess land under remnant theory was an 
invalid exercise of eminent domain power.46  The first federal regulation 
endorsing remnant theory specifically addressed “uneconomic 
remnants” as part of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (Federal Act).47  Section 
301(9) of the Federal Act gave the head of the federal agency 
 
40.  Johnson, supra note 2, at 384.  
41.  NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 7.06[6][b][iii]; see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17 § 175 
(2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7A-4.1 (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.52.050(2) 
(West 2013) (authorizing the condemnation of an entire parcel to serve the public interest 
even though only a portion is needed for the project). 
42.  State v. Buck, 226 A.2d 840, 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).  The New Jersey 
State Highway Commission was allowed to condemn five acres when only four were needed 
for the highway project because the cost to acquire the parcel needed was $45,000 and the 
entire property cost only $46,000.  Id. at 841–42.  The court also provided in dicta that the 
state may “incidentally seek to avoid creating or leaving a landlocked parcel or parcels that 
do not comply with local zoning requirements.”  Id. at 842.  The drafters of the Model 
Eminent Domain Code cited this dicta as examples of some types of remnants that section 
208 references.  See MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208 cmt., 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974). 
43.  See infra notes 54, 65 and accompanying text. 
44.  Nelson, supra note 10, at 62. 
45.  Id. (noting that only two statutes existed in 1959 that expressly authorized excess 
condemnation under remnant theory). 
46.  Id. 
47.  See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 301, 84 Stat. 1894, 1904–05 (1971). 
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responsible for acquiring the condemned property the authority to 
acquire an uneconomic remnant.48  Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9), 
“uneconomic remnant” was not defined until 1987 when the statute was 
amended to define an “uneconomic remnant” as “a parcel of real 
property . . . after the partial acquisition of the owner’s property . . . 
which the head of the Federal agency concerned has determined has 
little or no value or utility to the owner.”49   
In 1974, the Uniform Law Commissioners created the Model 
Eminent Domain Code (Model Code).50  Section 208 of the Model Code 
addressed uneconomic remnants and was based on section 301(9) of the 
Federal Act.51  However, because the Federal Act did not define an 
uneconomic remnant at the time the Model Code was drafted, the 
drafters provided their own definition.52  Section 208 reads as follows: 
(a) If the acquisition of only part of a property would leave 
its owner with an uneconomic remnant, the condemnor shall 
offer to acquire the remnant concurrently and may acquire it by 
purchase or by condemnation if the owner consents.  (b) 
 
48.  Id. § 301(9), 84 Stat. at 1905 (“If the acquisition of only part of a property would 
leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency concerned shall 
offer to acquire the entire property.”). 
49.  See Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-17, § 416, 101 Stat. 132, 255–56.  This session law amended section 301(9) of the 
Federal Act (42 U.S.C. § 4651(9)) to read as follows: 
If the acquisition of only a portion of a property would leave the owner with an 
uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency concerned shall offer to 
acquire that remnant.  For the purposes of this Act, an uneconomic remnant is a 
parcel of real property in which the owner is left with an interest after the partial 
acquisition of the owner’s property and which the head of the Federal agency 
concerned has determined has little or no value or utility to the owner. 
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9) (2012)). 
50.  See MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE, 13 U.L.A. 1 (1974).  The Model Eminent 
Domain Code was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws as the Uniform Eminent Domain Code.  Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, 
¶ 75, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764 (citing MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE, prefatory 
note, 13 U.L.A. 3 (1974)).  While the language remained the same, it was officially changed to 
a Model Code in 1984.  Id. ¶ 74 n.21 (citing MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE, prefatory 
note, 13 U.L.A. 1 (1974)).  Because Wisconsin did not adopt section 208 of the Uniform 
Eminent Domain Code word-for-word, see infra note 57, and the Uniform Eminent Domain 
Code was renamed as a Model Eminent Domain Code, this Comment will reference it only as 
the Model Code. 
51.  MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974); id. § 208 cmt. 
52.  See id. § 208 cmt.  Subsection (b) defines an “uneconomic remnant,” and the drafters 
stated that while “[s]ubsection (b) is not based upon the Federal Act, [it] is believed to be 
consistent with its intent.”  Id.  
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“Uneconomic remnant” as used in this section means a 
remainder following a partial taking of property, of such size, 
shape, or condition as to be of little value or that gives rise to a 
substantial risk that the condemnor will be required to pay in 
compensation for the part taken an amount substantially 
equivalent to the amount that would be required to be paid if it 
and the remainder were taken as a whole.53 
The drafters of section 208 provided a clear explanation for the 
specific provisions of the statute: 
Subsection (a) of Section 208, which is based upon section 
301, par. (9) of the Federal Acquisition Policies Act, goes beyond 
the federal act and expressly authorizes a condemnor to acquire 
an uneconomic remnant—a power which, under the language of 
the Federal Act, is only implied. 
Subsection (b) is not based upon the Federal Act, but is 
believed to be consistent with its intent.  Subsection (b) limits the 
operative effect of paragraph (a) to instances in which a partial 
taking results in one or more “physical” or “financial” 
remnants.54  
D. Drafting Wisconsin’s Uneconomic Remnant Statute 
While only one state adopted the entire Model Eminent Domain 
Code,55 many states enacted statutory provisions to address uneconomic 
remnants in a manner similar to section 301(9) of the Federal Act and 
section 208 of the Model Code.56  Wisconsin became one such state 
 
53.  Id. § 208. 
54.  Id. § 208 cmt. (emphasis added). 
55.  See Legislative Fact Sheet—Eminent Domain Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Eminent%20Domain%20Code, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QJ3T-CKXA (last visited June 2, 2015) (indicating that Alabama 
is the only state that enacted the entire Uniform Eminent Domain Code). 
56.  See, e.g., Act of May 7, 1971, ch. 41, § 1, 1971 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 7 (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. § 34.60.120(9) (2012)); Act of May 27, 1972, ch. 413, § 3, 58 Del. Laws 1216, 
1229 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(9) (2003)); Act of May 3, 1971, Act 32, § 5, 
1971 Haw. Sess. Laws 33, 35 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 113-5(9) (LexisNexis 
2013)); Act of May 20, 1971, ch. 333, § 4, 1971 Me. Laws 573, 580 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 23, § 154-C (1992)); Act of June 25, 1971, ch. 3, § 11, 1971 Mont. Laws 1825, 1834 
(codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-31-301 (2013)); Act of June 24, 1971, ch. 355, § 5, 1971 
Okla. Sess. Laws 1000, 1002 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 13(9) (West 1997)); Utah 
Relocation Assistance Act, ch. 24, § 13, 1972 Utah Laws 95, 101 (codified at UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-12-13(9) (LexisNexis 2010)); Act of May 20, 1971, ch. 240, § 18, 1971 Wash. Sess. 
Laws. 1074, 1084 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.26.180(9) (West 2007)) (enacting 
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when it enacted legislation to address “uneconomic remnants” based on 
section 208 of the Model Code.57  In 1977, Wisconsin’s uneconomic 
remnant statute was codified both as Wisconsin Statutes section 
32.05(3m) for quick-take proceedings and as Wisconsin Statutes section 
32.06(3m) for slow-take proceedings.58  The duplicity of this statute was 
necessary because Wisconsin has a two-track system for eminent 
domain proceedings.59  Condemnation proceedings for sewers and 
highways are quick-take proceedings.60  All other condemnation 
proceedings are slow-take proceedings.61  For purposes of this 
Comment, only section 32.06(3m) will be referenced in detail because 
this was the statutory provision relevant in Waller due to the fact that a 
high-voltage transmission line condemnation proceeding is a slow-take 
proceeding.62  
The Wisconsin Legislative Council Special Committee on Eminent 
Domain drafted the relevant language of the statute.63  The summary of 
the committee’s proceedings indicates that the draft legislation was 
intended to “allow[] condemnors to acquire uneconomic remnants” and 
that the statute was specifically based on section 208 of the Model 
Code.64  Section 32.06(3m) reads as follows: 
In this section, “uneconomic remnant” means the property 
remaining after a partial taking of property, if the property 
remaining is of such size, shape or condition as to be of little 
 
uneconomic remnant statutes with language that mirrored 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9)); see also 
Alabama Eminent Domain Code, No. 85-548, § 208, 1985 Ala. Acts 802, 806 (codified at 
ALA. CODE § 18-1A-27 (LexisNexis 2007)) (adopting word-for-word section 208 of the Model 
Code, including the language regarding financial remnants); Eminent Domain Procedure Act, 
No. 173, § 28-2-100, 1987 S.C. Acts 2074, 2082 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-100 (2007)) 
(adopting the section 208 language regarding financial remnants, but giving the state 
permission rather than a mandate to acquire the remnant—i.e, “may” instead of “shall”). 
57.  See Wis. Legis. Council, Summary of Proceedings: Special Comm. on Eminent 
Domain, 1977–1978 Legis. Sess. 5 (Sept. 9, 1977) [hereinafter Summary of Proceedings] 
(stating that the statute “is based on s. 208 of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code”).   
58.  See Act of June 6, 1978, ch. 440, § 3, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 1953, 1954 (codified at 
WIS. STAT. § 32.05 (2013–2014)); id. § 5, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 1956 (codified at WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.06 (1977)); see also Summary of Proceedings, supra note 57, at 5 (explaining that the 
language of the uneconomic remnant provision “applies to both quick taking and regular 
taking procedures”).  
59.  Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶ 56, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764.  
60.  Id. ¶ 57. 
61.  Id.  
62.  See id. ¶¶ 1–2, 57. 
63.  See Summary of Proceedings, supra note 57, at 1, 5. 
64.  Id. at 5.  
 2015] PICKING UP THE REMNANTS POST-WALLER 1439 
value or of substantially impaired economic viability.  If 
acquisition of only part of a property would leave its owner with 
an uneconomic remnant, the condemnor shall offer to acquire 
the remnant concurrently and may acquire it by purchase or by 
condemnation if the owner consents.65  
As the Waller decision discussed in Part III will illustrate, section 
32.06(3m) left open to interpretation if and when a landowner could 
bring an uneconomic remnant claim, and what exactly “substantially 
impaired economic viability” meant.66 
III. UNDERSTANDING WALLER V. AMERICAN TRANSMISSION CO. 
While Wisconsin enacted its uneconomic remnant statute in 1977, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was not asked to interpret the meaning of 
the statute until recently, in Waller v. American Transmission Co.67  
Although Waller produced four significant holdings,68 this Comment 
focuses on the proper interpretation of “substantially impaired 
economic viability,” a landowner’s right to bring an uneconomic 
remnant claim, and when such a claim is appropriate.69  Because Waller 
was the first Wisconsin case to address the legitimacy of a landowner’s 
uneconomic remnant claim, it is critical to understand the court’s 
reasoning regarding these issues in order to properly demonstrate the 
concerns raised by the Waller precedent.  
A. Facts of Waller 
To recognize the nature of the uneconomic remnant claim at issue in 
Waller, one must understand the facts that gave rise to the landowners’ 
claim.  The plaintiff landowners (the Wallers) purchased a 1.5 acre lot in 
1989, which included a single-family residence.70  The American 
 
65.  WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2011–2012). 
66.  See infra Part III.  
67.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 72–73.  
68.  See id. ¶¶ 118–21 (holding that (1) section 32.06(5), the “right-to-take” provision, 
was the proper and exclusive way for a property owner to bring an uneconomic remnant 
claim; (2) the Wallers’ property was an uneconomic remnant; (3) the Wallers were entitled to 
litigation expenses; and (4) the Wallers were displaced persons under section 32.19(2)(e)1.a). 
69.  See infra Parts IV–V.  
70.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 11. 
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Transmission Company (ATC)71 sought to condemn easements on two 
sides of the Waller property for purposes of erecting two high-voltage 
transmission lines.72  While the Wallers expressed concern that the high-
voltage lines presented possible health hazards and would impair their 
property’s value, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission found that 
the proposed easements presented no health and safety concerns and 
instead issued ATC a certificate of public convenience and necessity for 
the project.73  
Both ATC and the Wallers retained independent appraisers to 
assess the effect that the easements would have on the value of the 
Wallers’ property.74  While the appraisers’ before-easement valuations 
of the parcel were very similar ($130,000 vs. $132,000), the appraisers 
differed greatly as to the effect that the easements would have on the 
value of the Wallers’ property.75  The Wallers’ appraiser determined the 
easements would decrease the property value by 88% compared to the 
57% reduction that ATC’s appraiser determined.76  Interestingly, the 
Wallers’ appraiser later supplemented the initial appraisal by stating 
that the Waller property “suffered substantial[ly] impaired economic 
viability as a result of the taking of the transmission line easement.”77  
 
71.  ATC is a Wisconsin public utility company regulated by the Wisconsin Public 
Service Commission.  Id. ¶ 14.  Section 32.02(5)(b) “vests entities like ATC with the power of 
eminent domain.”  Id. 
72.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 19.  The Wallers’ property was already encumbered with one transmission 
line easement.  Id. ¶ 12.  Also, the land surrounding the Waller house had changed drastically 
since 1989, and by 2008, the surrounding area was an industrial park.  Id. ¶ 13.  Therefore, the 
diminished value of the Wallers’ property appears to have been due partially to external 
factors besides the proposed easements.  See Figure 1, infra Part V.B, for a depiction of the 
Wallers’ property after the taking of the easements.  
73.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 15–16.  The Wisconsin Public Service Commission (PSC) 
determined that the transmission lines “[would] not have undue adverse impacts on [the] 
public health and welfare.”  Id. ¶ 16 (first alteration in original). 
74.  Id. ¶¶ 20–21.  ATC retained John Rolling of Rolling & Co. as its appraiser, and Mr. 
Rolling appraised the Wallers’ property before the taking of the easements at $130,000.  Id. 
¶ 20.  The Wallers retained Arthur Sullivan and Kurt Kielisch of Group One as their 
appraisers, and Group One valued the property at $132,000 prior to the taking of the 
easements.  Id. ¶ 21.   
75.  See id. ¶¶ 20–22.  
76.  Id.  ATC’s appraiser concluded that after the high-voltage transmission line 
easements were installed, the value of the property would decrease to $55,500.  Id. ¶ 20.  
However, the Wallers’ appraiser concluded that the easements would decrease the property 
value to $15,500.  Id. ¶ 22. 
77.  Id. ¶ 23 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
supplemented language appears to be an attempt to mirror the language in section 32.06(3m) 
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The appraiser indicated that “public perceptions of the dangers of 
electric magnetic fields” and the locations of the transmission lines were 
partly responsible for his low valuation.78 
After the parties failed to reach an agreement through 
negotiations,79 ATC made a jurisdictional offer to the Wallers of $99,500 
for the two easements.80  However, the Wallers refused this offer and 
instead brought a right-to-take action against ATC.81  In Wisconsin, a 
right-to-take action is a separate cause of action from a claim of a taking 
without just compensation and addresses any issue related to the taking 
other than the adequacy of the compensation.82  However, the Wallers 
did not challenge ATC’s right to take the transmission line easements 
but instead argued that they would be left with a property that was an 
 
regarding uneconomic remnants.  See WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2011–2012).  The Waller 
appraiser’s low valuation was based in part on the following assessment:  
ATC’s jurisdictional offer indicated a value of $30,500 for the property, reflecting a 
loss of value of more than 76 percent; the easement area covered more than half of 
the property; “public perceptions of the dangers of electric magnetic fields”; the 
appearance and proximity of the high-voltage transmission lines; the highest and 
best use of the property after the taking would be vacant industrial; and the inability 
of the parcel to be utilized for industrial purposes in the absence of municipal sewer 
and water. 
Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 23.  
78.  Id.; see also KURT C. KIELISCH, VALUATION GUIDELINES FOR PROPERTIES WITH 
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES, available at http://headwaterseconomics.org/library/files/A
ppraisalGroupOne;ValuationGuidelines.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7GNU-MKV2.  This 
article was written by one of the appraisers the Wallers hired, and he clearly indicates that he 
considers the public’s perceived fear of high-voltage transmission lines in valuating properties 
that will be encumbered with these transmission line easements.  See id. at 12.  
79.  Section 32.06(2a) requires a condemnor to negotiate with the property owner before 
making a jurisdictional offer.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 24.  ATC initially offered $49,000 for the 
two easements.  Id.  ATC then raised its offer twice, first to $84,600 and finally to $99,500.  Id.  
Alternatively, ATC offered to acquire the entire Waller property for $132,000 if the Wallers 
waived any right to relocation benefits.  Id.  The Wallers rejected each of these offers.  Id. 
80.  Id. ¶ 25.  If negotiations are unsuccessful, a condemnor is required to make a 
jurisdictional offer to the landowner, which includes a description of the property sought, the 
proposed date of condemnation, and the amount of compensation offered.  WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.06(3) (2011–2012); see also id. § 32.05(3) (describing the contents of a jurisdictional offer, 
which are also applicable to condemnation proceedings under section 32.06). 
81.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 25–26.  
82.  Id. ¶¶ 66–67; see also WIS. STAT. § 32.06(5).  Any claim regarding just compensation 
is brought before the county condemnation commission.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 66.  However, 
if a landowner seeks to contest the condemnor’s right to take the property for any reason 
other than compensation, a separate “right-to-take” action is filed.  Id.; see also WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.06(5). 
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uneconomic remnant under section 32.06(3m).83  Thus, the Wallers 
claimed that ATC should be required to acquire the entire Waller 
property as a fee simple taking with a right to relocation benefits.84  
B. Key Issues Addressed in Waller 
While this litigation continued for several years, including three 
circuit court proceedings and two appeals before the court of appeals,85 
ultimately the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to interpret section 
32.06(3m) and to apply the statute to the Wallers’ uneconomic remnant 
claim.86  Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court was not bound by the lower courts’ 
interpretation of section 32.06(3m) or by the application of the statute to 
the Wallers’ case.87  The key issues that the court addressed included 
whether a landowner could bring an uneconomic remnant claim and, if 
so, when such a claim could be brought.88  The court then had to 
interpret the meaning of “substantially impaired economic viability” and 
determine whether the Wallers’ property was indeed an uneconomic 
remnant.89 
 
83.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 26. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. ¶ 10.  The first appeal to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Waller I) produced 
the holding that an uneconomic remnant claim was properly raised in a separate right-to-take 
action.  Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2009 WI App 172, ¶ 17, 322 Wis. 2d 255, 776 N.W.2d 
612.  The circuit court had previously determined that an uneconomic remnant claim should 
be decided in a valuation proceeding and had dismissed the Wallers’ right-to-take action.  Id. 
¶ 9.  In the second appeal to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Waller II), the court concluded 
that the circuit court on remand erred in basing its conclusion that the Waller property was 
not an uneconomic remnant on the just compensation jury verdict, which determined the 
after-taking value of the Wallers’ property was $38,000.  Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 
2011 WI App 91, ¶¶ 10, 15, 334 Wis. 2d 740, 799 N.W.2d. 487.  In Waller II, the court of 
appeals decided that the circuit court “failed to address whether the Wallers’ remaining 
property was ‘substantially impaired’ as to its economic viability,” id. ¶ 14, and that “the 
inquiry does not end once the dollar value of the remaining property is determined,” id. ¶ 15.  
86.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77.  This case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court on a 
petition for bypass of the court of appeals.  Id. ¶ 1.  The case consolidated the Wallers’ 
relocation benefits case and the Wallers’ right-to-take action.  See id. 
87.  Id. ¶ 51.  “Statutory interpretation and application present questions of law that . . . 
[are] review[ed] de novo while benefiting from the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit 
court.”  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶ 41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citing Heritage 
Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶ 24, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465). 
88.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 70–71. 
89.  See id. ¶¶ 75, 93. 
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1. A Landowner’s Right to Bring an Uneconomic Remnant Claim 
The court began its interpretation of section 32.06(3m) by 
addressing the question of whether a landowner even had a right to 
bring an uneconomic remnant claim.90  ATC argued that the legislative 
history of the Wisconsin uneconomic remnant statute supported the 
conclusion that “the decision to acquire an uneconomic remnant should 
be determined by the condemnor, and thus, property owners do not 
have a cause of action for an uneconomic remnant.”91  ATC also argued 
that if such a claim were allowed, the claim should be brought in a 
valuation proceeding to determine just compensation, not in a separate 
right-to-take action.92  
In determining that a landowner had a right to bring an uneconomic 
remnant claim, the court concluded that the legislative history of section 
32.06(3m) indicated that the statute was intended to give condemnors 
the authority to acquire uneconomic remnants, but not “sole authority,” 
and that the landowner “must have some recourse to assert and prove 
the uneconomic remnant claim.”93  The court cited a 1977 Wisconsin 
Legislative Council report that stated, “[The legislation] provides 
landowners with a means of disposing of portions of their property 
which would be substantially reduced in value by a condemnation 
project.”94  While other comments from a 1977 eminent domain special 
committee meeting did suggest the statute was designed simply to give 
condemnors authority to acquire economic remnants,95 the court 
resolved the ambiguity in the statute as to whether a landowner could 
bring a claim by pointing out that because eminent domain power is 
extraordinary, the court was obligated to “strictly construe the 
 
90.  Id. ¶¶ 70–71. 
91.  Id. ¶ 77. 
92.  Id. ¶ 70.  ATC also argued that if an uneconomic remnant claim could not be raised 
in a valuation proceeding, then an inverse condemnation proceeding would also be more 
appropriate than a right-to-take action.  See id.  However, because this Comment argues that 
the proper place for an uneconomic remnant claim is in a valuation proceeding, the inverse 
condemnation argument is not relevant to this discussion.   
93.  Id. ¶ 77. 
94.  Id. ¶ 78 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL, 
REP. NO. 28 TO THE 1977 LEGISLATURE: LEGISLATION RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN, 
1977–1978 Sess., at 4 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95.  The summary of proceedings from a 1977 Legislative Council Special Committee on 
Eminent Domain meeting provides commentary from staff attorneys for the Wisconsin 
Legislative Council asserting that the uneconomic remnant statute would “allow[] 
condemnors to acquire uneconomic remnants” and give them “authority to acquire 
uneconomic remnants in a few cases.”  Summary of Proceedings, supra note 57, at 5. 
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condemnor’s power . . . while liberally construing provisions favoring 
the landowner, including available remedies and compensation.”96 
2. Right-to-Take Action vs. Just Compensation Hearing 
Once the court in Waller determined that the Wallers had a cause of 
action under Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute, the court then 
determined that the proper way for a landowner to raise an uneconomic 
remnant claim was in a separate right-to-take action, not in a just 
compensation valuation hearing.97  The court reasoned that while 
determining the existence of an uneconomic remnant was related to the 
just compensation issue, it was “fundamentally different from a 
calculation of the fair market value of an easement.”98  The court 
rationalized that “if a court finds that a property would become an 
uneconomic remnant if the condemnor took an easement, the 
condemnor might not have a right to take the easement without offering 
to purchase the entire property.”99  Therefore, the court determined that 
an uneconomic remnant claim must be brought in a separate right-to-
take action prior to any claim of inadequate compensation.100  
3. The Wallers’ Property As An Uneconomic Remnant 
The court then analyzed whether the Wallers’ property after the 
taking of the two transmission line easements was indeed an 
uneconomic remnant.101  The court focused on whether the Wallers’ 
property after the taking of the two easements was “of such size, shape 
or condition as to be of little value or of substantially impaired economic 
viability.”102  The court analyzed the uneconomic remnant inquiry by 
combining the language before the “or” with the language after the “or” 
and ultimately concluded that the property was “of such size, shape, and 
 
96.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 72 (alteration in original) (quoting TFJ Nominee Trust v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Transp., 2001 WI App 116, ¶ 10, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
97.  Id. ¶ 90. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id.  
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. ¶ 93. 
102.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2011–2012)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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condition as to be of substantially impaired economic viability as either 
a residential or an industrial parcel.”103  
IV. “SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED ECONOMIC VIABILITY” AS 
INTERPRETED IN WALLER CREATES A CONFUSING HYBRID REMNANT 
Even though the Wallers’ amended appraisal included language 
indicating that the property suffered “substantially impaired economic 
viability” as a result of the taking of the transmission line easements,104 
section 32.06(3m) had never been interpreted.105  Therefore, such a 
conclusion was without merit until the court determined exactly what 
“substantially impaired economic viability” meant.  In critiquing the 
Waller court’s interpretation of “substantially impaired economic 
viability” and its significance, it is also important to recognize that the 
confusion regarding the proper interpretation of this phrase was largely 
created by the Wisconsin legislature’s unexplained modification of 
section 208 of the Model Code. 
A. Ambiguity Created in Drafting Wisconsin’s  
Uneconomic Remnant Statute 
The legislative history behind the drafting of Wisconsin’s 
uneconomic remnant statute leaves no question that the drafters relied 
on section 208 of the Model Code to draft the statute.106  What is less 
clear is why the drafters did not simply adopt the statute word-for-
word.107  As introduced in Part II, section 208 of the Model Code 
contains two subsections.108  Subsection (a) is the operative section, 
authorizing and requiring a condemnor to acquire a remnant when one 
exists.109  Subsection (b) limits the operative effect of subsection (a) to 
physical remnants and financial remnants.110  Subsection (b) contains 
two clauses.111  The first clause—“a remainder following a partial taking 
 
103.  Id. ¶ 119. 
104.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
105.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 72–76, 93–105. 
106.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
107.  Compare Act of June 6, 1978, ch. 440, § 5, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 1953, 1956 
(codified at WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2013–2014)), with MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE 
§ 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974). 
108.  MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22. 
109.  Id. § 208 cmt. 
110.  Id.  
111.  Id. § 208. 
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of property, of such size, shape, or condition as to be of little value”112—
is the traditional definition of a physical remnant.113  The second 
clause—“[a remainder] that gives rise to a substantial risk that the 
condemnor will be required to pay in compensation for the part taken 
an amount substantially equivalent to the amount that would be 
required to be paid if it and the remainder were taken as a whole”114—is 
the traditional definition for financial remnants like those in Public 
Works.115  When the Wisconsin legislature drafted section 32.06(3m), the 
legislature did not alter the language of subsection (b) of the Model 
Code regarding physical remnants but inexplicably altered the language 
of subsection (b) regarding financial remnants to read “or of 
substantially impaired economic viability.”116  The summary of 
legislative proceedings regarding the drafting of the provision indicates 
that the phrase was simply added on motion.117  
B. Two Potential Meanings of “Substantially  
Impaired Economic Viability” 
There are two possible explanations as to why the Wisconsin 
legislature chose to modify the language from the Model Code 
regarding financial remnants to instead include the phrase “substantially 
impaired economic viability.”  The drafters of section 32.06(3m) could 
have intended that the phrase did not apply to financial remnants at all 
but instead broadened the definition of physical remnants by requiring 
that a physical remnant just be of “substantially impaired economic 
viability” even if it is not of “little value.”  In contrast, the legislature 
could have intended that the phrase was simply a more concise 
 
112.  Id. 
113.  See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
114.  MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974). 
115.  See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
116.  Compare Act of June 6, 1978, ch. 440, § 5, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 1953, 1956 
(codified at WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2013–2014), with MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE 
§ 208, 13 U.L.A. 22; see also Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶ 75, 350 Wis. 2d 
242, 833 N.W.2d 764 (discussing the modification of Wisconsin Statutes section 32.06(3m) 
from section 208 of the Model Eminent Domain Code). 
117.  See Summary of Proceedings, supra note 57, at 5 (providing that “substantially 
impaired economic viability” was added on motion but without any further discussion or 
explanation of the matter).  
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reference to the financial remnant language in section 208 of the Model 
Code it replaced.118 
The court in Waller could have potentially adopted the first 
interpretation that “substantially impaired economic viability” was 
intended to broaden the definition of physical remnants by focusing on 
the following commentary from a 1977 Wisconsin legislative report: 
“The Bill provides landowners with a means of disposing of portions of 
their property which would be substantially reduced in value by a 
condemnation project.”119  This commentary arguably could be 
interpreted to suggest that the legislature did not intend for a physical 
remnant to be of “little value” but instead just to be “substantially 
reduced in value.”120  However, the legislature could have easily clarified 
such an interpretation by replacing “little value” with “substantially 
reduced in value” in the statutory language.  Furthermore, interpreting 
“substantially impaired economic viability” as a broader version of 
“little value” would mean that the legislature did not intend for the 
statute to include any language from the Model Code regarding 
financial remnants, and therefore, uneconomic remnants would be 
limited to physical remnants.121  
Instead, the court in Waller adopted the second interpretation that 
“substantially impaired economic viability” was a “more succinct” 
version of the Model Code language it replaced.122  By adopting this 
interpretation, the court should have recognized that “substantially 
 
118.  The language prior to “or” in section 208 of the Model Eminent Domain Code 
referenced physical remnants, and the language after “or” referenced financial remnants.  See 
supra notes 53–54, 110–15 and accompanying text.  “Substantially impaired economic 
viability” comes after “or” in section 32.06(3m), indicating that it refers to financial remnants.  
119.  See WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL, REP. NO. 28 TO THE 1977 LEGISLATURE: LEGISLATION 
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN, 1977–1978 Sess., at 4 (1977). 
120.  Such an interpretation would mean that “substantially impaired economic 
viability” was intended to be combined with the language prior to “or.”   
121.  See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.  
122.  Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶ 75, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 
764 (“The Special Committee replaced the above emphasized language with the more 
succinct phrase ‘substantially impaired economic viability.’”).  The “above emphasized” 
language that the Wisconsin Supreme Court references in Waller is the language from section 
208 of the Model Eminent Domain Code regarding financial remnants.  See supra notes 53–
54, 114–15 and accompanying text.  The majority makes this clear in its opinion by placing 
emphasis on the following language: “that gives rise to a substantial risk that the condemnor 
will be required to pay in compensation for the part taken an amount substantially equivalent 
to the amount that would be required to be paid if it and the remainder were taken as a 
whole.”  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 75 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN 
CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22–23 (2002)). 
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impaired economic viability” applied only to financial remnants.  
Therefore, the Wallers’ property would have been of “substantially 
impaired economic viability” only if the severance damages equaled the 
cost of acquiring the entire property.123  In Waller, the severance 
damages were originally determined to be only $90,000 and were raised 
to only $94,000 after a jury verdict.124  Both amounts were much less 
than the cost to acquire the entire property and were actually less than 
ATC’s jurisdictional offer, proving that the Wallers’ property, with a 
still “habitable home,” was not a financial remnant.125  This finding 
should have ended the analysis of whether the Wallers’ property was an 
uneconomic remnant and established precedent in Wisconsin that 
“substantially impaired economic viability” references only financial 
remnants.  
C. Waller’s Creation of a Hybrid Remnant 
Whether the Wisconsin legislature truly intended for “substantially 
impaired economic viability” to mean the same as the Model Code 
language it replaced is somewhat debatable.126  However, such an 
interpretation is reasonable considering the language this phrase 
replaced involved similar “substantial risk” and “substantially 
equivalent” language from section 208 of the Model Code.127  What is 
clear is that because the court determined that “substantially impaired 
economic viability” equaled language from the Model Code regarding 
financial remnants, this phrase should not have been combined with the 
language from section 32.06(3m) referencing physical remnants.  
Nevertheless, both the majority and the dissent in Waller combined 
“substantially impaired economic viability” with the language regarding 
physical remnants, disagreeing only as to whether the property’s “size, 
shape, and condition [was] of substantially impaired economic 
viability.”128  
 
123.  See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
124.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 28, 35. 
125.  See id. ¶ 103.  The cost to acquire the entire property was $132,000, ATC’s 
jurisdictional offer was $99,500, and severance damages, even after the jury verdict in the 
valuation case, were only $94,000.  Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 35. 
126.  See supra Part IV.B. 
127.  See MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974).  
128.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 119. The majority held that the Wallers’ property was an 
uneconomic remnant because “it [was] of such size, shape, and condition as to be of 
substantially impaired economic viability.”  Id.  Justice Bradley disagreed, stating, “[T]he 
Wallers have failed to establish that the size, shape or condition of the property remaining 
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As Part V will discuss in further detail, after the taking of the high-
voltage transmission line easements, no physical remnant existed 
because the easements formed a border around the property instead of 
severing the property into multiple fragments.129  Moreover, the court 
conceded that the property after the taking was not “valueless.”130  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that, after the taking of the two 
transmission line easements, the Wallers’ property was an uneconomic 
remnant because “it [was] of such size, shape, and condition as to be of 
substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an 
industrial parcel.”131  This conclusion creates a confusing hybrid remnant 
because, post-Waller, a property now does not have to be either a 
physical remnant or a financial remnant to be an uneconomic remnant.  
The entire property only has to be of “substantially impaired economic 
viability.”132  This conflicts squarely with the legislative intent of section 
208 of the Model Code, on which section 32.06(3m) was based and 
which limited uneconomic remnants to physical remnants and financial 
remnants.133  This hybrid remnant classification is more of a totality-of-
the-circumstances inquiry than the black and white physical or financial 
remnant inquiry.134  
V. NO PHYSICAL REMNANT—NO FINANCIAL REMNANT—NO 
UNECONOMIC REMNANT: SEVERANCE DAMAGES ARE THE PROPER 
REMEDY INSTEAD. 
While ATC argued that the legislative intent behind section 
32.06(3m) did not give a landowner a right to bring an uneconomic 
remnant claim, the supreme court disagreed.135  This Comment does not 
 
after the taking is of ‘substantially impaired economic viability.’”  Id. ¶ 181 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  
129.  See infra Part V.B.  
130.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 103 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Waller from two other 
cases where that state’s uneconomic remnant statute required the property to be of little 
value).  
131.  Id. ¶ 119. 
132.  See id. 
133.  See MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208 cmt., 13 U.L.A. 22 (1974). 
134.  On remand after the second court of appeals decision, the circuit court’s 
determination that the Wallers’ property suffered “substantially impaired economic viability,” 
which was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was based on multiple factors instead of 
simply determining if the property was a physical or financial remnant.  See Waller, 2013 WI 
77, ¶ 42. 
135.  Id. ¶ 77. 
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take issue with the landowner’s right to bring an uneconomic remnant 
claim in certain situations.  Rather, if the scope of uneconomic remnant 
claims were properly limited to physical remnant and financial 
remnants, the confusing hybrid remnant created in Waller would have 
been avoided.  However, this does not mean the landowner will not 
have an appropriate remedy in cases where an easement devalues 
property without creating a physical remnant or a financial remnant. 
A. Landowners Do Have a Right to Bring an Uneconomic Remnant 
Claim . . . In Proper Circumstances 
Before the enactment of any federal or state legislation regarding 
uneconomic remnants, one could seriously question whether a 
landowner even had the right to bring an uneconomic remnant claim.136  
After all, remnant theory was historically viewed as one justification for 
a government agency to acquire excess land in a partial taking.137  
Authorizing a condemnor to acquire land in excess of what is 
specifically needed for a public project does not necessarily imply that a 
condemnor must take a remnant when one exists. 
However, once statutes were enacted, the plain language suggested 
that the statutes did not simply grant a condemning agency permission 
to acquire a remnant, but instead required the agency to acquire a 
remnant when one existed.  Specifically, uneconomic remnant statutes 
that used the word “shall” instead of “may” strongly suggested that the 
statutes were intended as mandates for the condemning agency to 
acquire a remnant.138  As noted in Part II, 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9), section 
208 of the Model Code, and Wisconsin Statutes section 32.06(3m) all 
provide, in part, that the condemning agency “shall” acquire an 
 
136.  See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 45 & n.17 (suggesting that a city could purchase a 
remnant from a landowner if the landowner consents, but only if a state statute authorized 
such a practice, while also stating that an owner of a remnant can neither be forced to sell nor 
compel the state to purchase the remnant). 
137.  See supra Part II.A. 
138.  The use of the word “may” is ordinarily permissive, whereas the use of word 
“shall” is presumed to be mandatory.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, 
¶ 32, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465; see also Winkel v. Miller, 205 P.3d 688, 694 (Kan. 
2009) (reasoning that the use of the word “may” instead of “shall” creates a presumption that 
the legislature intended to make the acquisition of fee simple interest rather than an 
easement permissive).  But see City of Dover v. Cartanza, 541 A.2d 580, 582–83 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1988) (holding that, while “it is generally presumed that the word ‘shall’ indicates a 
mandatory requirement,” because courts have interpreted Delaware laws containing “shall” 
as either mandatory or directory, compliance with the provisions of Delaware’s Real Property 
Acquisitions Act is directory rather than mandatory). 
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uneconomic remnant.139  Nevertheless, courts have not universally 
agreed that a landowner ever has a right to bring an uneconomic 
remnant claim.140 
Because section 208 of the Model Code and section 32.06(3m) did 
not expressly provide that a landowner had the right to bring an 
uneconomic remnant claim, the court in Waller properly looked to the 
intent of the legislature to determine that the drafters intended for the 
statute to give landowners a means to dispose of a remnant and, 
therefore, a landowner had the right to bring an uneconomic remnant 
claim.141  Likewise, the drafters of the Model Code drafted section 208 
with the intent that a landowner would be able to bring an uneconomic 
remnant claim if the state agency failed to comply with the statutory 
provision by not properly recognizing the existence of a remnant.142  
However, the drafters also indicated that section 208 was more of a 
“clean-up” provision, authorizing the state to acquire an uneconomic 
remnant rather than a provision meant to increase uneconomic remnant 
claims by landowners.143  If uneconomic remnant claims were properly 
 
139.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9) (2012); MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 
22 (1974); WIS. STAT. § 32.06(3m) (2013–2014); see also supra Parts II.C–D. 
140.  See New Mexico ex rel. N.M. State Highway Dep’t v. United States, 665 F.2d 1023, 
1028 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“Section 301(9) . . . contemplate[s] that the head of the federal agency 
concerned . . . has the power and duty to make a determination whether or not a remaining 
part of [the] land would be an uneconomic remnant, not the owner of [the] parcel of land.”); 
Nall Motors, Inc. v. Iowa City, 410 F. Supp. 111, 114–15 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff’d, 533 F.2d 381 
(8th Cir. 1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 4651 created no substantive rights for the landowner 
to argue that the federal agency failed to recognize an uneconomic remnant); State ex rel. 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Evans, 2010 OK Civ App 107, ¶ 1, 241 P.3d 273, 275 (holding that 
Oklahoma’s uneconomic remnant statute is “an expression of policy directed to the 
condemning authority concerning uneconomic remnants which is unenforceable by a private 
party”). 
141.  See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.  
142.  See PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS, ANNUAL CONFERENCE IN ITS 81ST YEAR: UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN 
CODE 37 (1972) (determining that a question as to whether the condemnor complied with the 
provisions of the statute would arise only if the condemnor refused to make an offer to 
acquire the remnant, and therefore, “[u]nder the present contemplated scheme of the act, 
[the] question [of whether an uneconomic remnant exists] would arise as part of a preliminary 
objection pleaded by the owner in his answer”). 
143.  See id. at 41–42.  The following commentary from the summary of proceedings 
regarding the drafting of section 208 indicates the statute was not intended to increase 
uneconomic remnant claims by landowners but rather to authorize a state agency to condemn 
uneconomic remnants:  
MR. TORVINEN: I think the real thrust of this section is to give authority to a 
public agency as a condemnor, because the remedy, as I see it, to the property 
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confined to only physical remnants and financial remnants as the 
drafters of the Model Code envisioned, allowing a landowner a right to 
bring an uneconomic remnant claim should not have inevitably led to 
litigation like Waller.  The reason for this conclusion is that an 
uneconomic remnant claim would be appropriate only if the remainder 
of the property after a partial taking was of “little value” or the 
severance damages equaled the cost of acquiring the entire parcel.144 
B. Uneconomic Remnants Should Be Limited to Physical  
Remnants and Financial Remnants 
Although the Waller holding allowing a landowner to bring an 
uneconomic remnant claim properly reflects the intent of the legislature, 
limiting uneconomic remnants to physical remnants and financial 
remnants will eliminate the confusion of applying the hybrid 
uneconomic remnant definition of Waller in easement condemnation 
proceedings.  Wisconsin appears to be the first state to find that an 
uneconomic remnant exists following an easement condemnation other 
than for a highway project and the first state to find that an uneconomic 
remnant exists where the property was not fragmented.145  Very few 
courts have even analyzed an uneconomic remnant claim in an easement 
condemnation proceeding other than for a permanent highway 
easement.146  At least one state, Oregon, has questioned whether 
uneconomic remnant claims ever make sense in the context of such 
easement condemnations.147  Whether an uneconomic remnant claim is 
ever permissible in an easement condemnation should be determined 
 
owner in many states, even to the extent, in the rare case of an inverse 
condemnation, where the taking is almost complete, and you require full 
compensation, although it’s in a technical sense severance damage, or consequential 
damage, and on either the theory of inverse condemnation or severance damage the 
property owner is going to ordinarily receive his full compensation.   
So this is really just a clean-up deal for the state agency, or the condemnor, to 
make his operation more flexible.  
MR. DEACON: We agree. 
Id.  
144.  See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.  
145.  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.   
146.  See supra note 7.  
147.  See City of Lake Oswego v. Babson, 776 P.2d 870, 873 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“[This 
court has] found no case in which [uneconomic remnant] theory has been considered in the 
taking of an easement.  However, even assuming that it does apply to an easement taking, it is 
not applicable in this case, because the remnants here are not valueless.”). 
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not by the type of condemnation proceeding but instead by whether a 
physical remnant or a financial remnant is created.148  When an 
easement condemnation project simply devalues the landowner’s 
property without creating a physical remnant or a financial remnant, 
neither the landowner, as was the case in Waller, nor the condemning 
agency should be allowed to argue that the entire property must be 
acquired. 
Understanding the layout of the Wallers’ property helps explain why 
this should be the case, as well as why the proper remedy for the 
devaluation of a landowner’s property created by an easement that does 
not create a physical remnant or a financial remnant is severance 
damages.  Below is a depiction of the Wallers’ property (Figure 1), as 
provided by Justice Bradley, dissenting in Waller.149  As you can see 
from Figure 1, the transmission line easements formed a border along 
two sides of the Wallers’ residential property.150 
  
 
148.  One could argue that an easement condemnation other than for a highway will 
never create a physical or financial remnant because the easement will likely not sever a 
property into fragments or result in severance damages equaling the cost of acquiring the 
entire parcel.  However, limiting uneconomic remnants to physical remnants and financial 
remnants will at least greatly reduce the likelihood that an easement condemnation will 
create an uneconomic remnant.  
149.  See Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶ 137, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 
N.W.2d 764 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
150.  See id. ¶ 19 (majority opinion) (discussing the proposed layout of the easements 
along two sides of the Wallers’ property). 
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Figure 1 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the high-voltage transmission lines did not 
divide the Wallers’ property in two fragmented parcels.  Instead, the 
property was simply a small parcel to begin with, and the parcel was 
further reduced in both size and value by the easements bordering the 
property.151  Thus, the classic definition of a physical remnant is not 
applicable because, as Justice Bradley points out, the entire property 
was still “intact.”152  Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the 
severance damages did not equal the cost of acquiring the entire 
property, so the Wallers’ property was not a financial remnant.153  Only 
the court’s creation of a hybrid remnant by combining “substantially 
 
151.  See id. ¶ 98.  
152.  See id. ¶ 135 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  Justice Bradley was correct in asserting that 
the Wallers’ property was not an uneconomic remnant because “a remnant necessarily means 
something that is remaining or left over.”  Id. ¶ 134.  However, Justice Bradley did not go as 
far as to argue that the reason was because the property was neither a physical remnant nor a 
financial remnant, and she actually combined the language of each in her analysis as well.  See 
supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing that both the majority and the dissent 
combined the language for physical remnants and financial remnants in one inquiry).  
153.  See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.  
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impaired economic viability” with “property of size, shape, or 
condition” allowed the court to conclude that the Wallers’ property was 
an uneconomic remnant.154 
C. If No Physical Remnant or Financial Remnant Is Created, 
Devaluation of Property Should Result in Severance Damages 
While it may be true that high-voltage transmission lines create a 
“fear and stigma” that diminishes the value of property,155 this 
devaluation of property does not itself create a physical remnant or a 
financial remnant.  While in Public Works the court allowed the state to 
condemn the entire parcel, the reason was not because a physical 
remnant was created or because the condemnor would be required to 
pay some severance damages, but because the severance damages would 
have equaled the cost of acquiring the entire parcel.156  Financial 
remnant theory does not allow a condemning agency to acquire an 
entire property just to avoid paying some severance damages, but 
instead where the severance damages equal the cost of acquiring the 
entire property.157  Likewise, a landowner should not be allowed to 
compel the condemning agency to acquire an entire property simply 
because severance damages exist, if the property is neither a physical 
remnant nor a financial remnant.  Instead, the proper remedy in any 
case, including easement condemnation proceedings where a property is 
devalued without creating a physical or a financial remnant, is severance 
damages. 
 
154.  See supra Part IV.C.  
155.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  “Fear and stigma” is another way of 
saying the “public perception of the dangers” created by the high-voltage transmission lines.  
See Hoekstra v. Guardian Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245, ¶¶ 23–24, 298 Wis. 2d 165, 726 
N.W.2d 648 (discussing the “fear and stigma” of natural gas transmission pipelines). 
156.  See People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Superior Court, 436 P.2d 342, 346–47 
(Cal. 1968) (noting that California’s uneconomic remnant statute “does not authorize excess 
condemnation anytime the condemnee claims severance or consequential damages,” but 
concluding that the taking of the entire parcel in the present case “can probably be 
condemned for little more than the cost of taking the part needed for the highway and paying 
damages for the remainder”). 
157.  See id. at 345–47; see also State Highway Comm’n v. Chapman, 446 P.2d 709, 713 
(Mont. 1968) (distinguishing a parcel where the severance damages do not equal the cost to 
acquire the entire parcel from Public Works and holding that financial remnant theory does 
not permit the taking of a remaining parcel where the severance damages are not excessive); 
Droz, supra note 26, at 44 (noting that “excessive severance damages seems to be limited to 
cases where the severance damages nearly equal the value of the fee”). 
 1456 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1425 
Wisconsin law already provides that the remedy for devaluation of 
property in an easement condemnation proceeding is severance 
damages.158  Severance damages are defined as “the diminution in the 
fair market value of the remaining land that occurs because of [a] 
taking.”159  In other words, the landowner is compensated for damages 
created by the easement but retains title to the property.160  Even in 
cases like Waller, where the landowner’s devaluation of property is 
largely due to the “public perception of the dangers” created by the 
easement,161 severance damages still provide a proper remedy.  In 
Hoekstra v. Guardian Pipeline, LLC, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
held that testimony regarding the “fear and stigma” related to a natural 
gas transmission pipeline easement was admissible in determining the 
diminished value of the property necessary for computing severance 
damages.162  
Therefore, in cases like Waller, where the landowner’s appraiser 
finds that that the perceived dangers of the high-voltage power lines 
lead to diminished value of the property, such a finding will enable the 
landowner to receive more compensation in the form of severance 
damages.163  Instead of arguing that the transmission line easement has 
left the landowner with an uneconomic remnant due to decreased value 
of the property, the landowner’s proper remedy would be to bring a just 
compensation claim, arguing that the severance damages were 
 
158.  See WIS. STAT. § 32.09(6g) (2013–2014) (“In the case of the taking of an easement, 
the compensation to be paid by the condemnor shall be determined by deducting from the 
fair market value of the whole property immediately before the date of evaluation, the fair 
market value of the remainder immediately after the date of the evaluation . . . .”). 
159.  Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶ 14, 281 Wis. 2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 
194 (alteration in original) (quoting Alsum v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 2004 WI App 196, ¶ 12, 
276 Wis. 2d 654, 689 N.W.2d 68) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
160.  See 98 AM. JUR. TRIALS Dominant Estate Owner’s Abandonment of Easement of 
Way § 2 (2005) (defining an easement as a property interest in land that is separated from the 
land itself and “confers no title to the land on which it is imposed”). 
161.  See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.  
162.  Hoekstra v. Guardian Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245, ¶¶ 23–24, 298 Wis. 2d 165, 
726 N.W.2d 648. 
163.  “Numerous jurisdictions throughout the country have admitted evidence regarding 
fear and safety concerns of natural gas transmission pipelines, electrical transmission lines and 
oil and gasoline pipelines [to calculate severance damages] in partial takings cases . . . .” 
Arents, 2005 WI App 61, ¶ 17 (citing Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Fear of Powerline, Gas 
or Oil Pipeline, or Related Structure as Element of Damages in Easement Condemnation 
Proceeding, 23 A.L.R. 4th 631 (1983)).  
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inadequate.164  Nevertheless, as long as Wisconsin law allows for 
landowners to bring an uneconomic remnant claim in an easement 
condemnation proceeding in which neither a physical remnant nor a 
financial remnant is created, courts will be confronted with much 
confusion as to whether the proper remedy for devaluation of property 
is severance damages or a mandated acquisition of the entire parcel.  
This will be the case especially in condemnation proceedings for high-
voltage transmission line easements and natural gas line easements, 
where the “fear and stigma” of these easements may continue to 
diminish the value of property without fragmenting the property.165 
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF WALLER AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO 
WISCONSIN’S UNECONOMIC REMNANT STATUTE 
Because Waller is the first case to interpret Wisconsin’s uneconomic 
remnant statute that was enacted more than thirty years ago, it is likely 
too early to determine exactly how this case will impact Wisconsin 
eminent domain proceedings.  Nevertheless, due to the combination of 
the Waller court’s questionable interpretation of the phrase 
“substantially impaired economic viability” and its unique application of 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute in an easement condemnation 
proceeding, it is worth considering the significance of the Waller 
decision and proposed modifications to section 32.06(3m).  These 
statutory modifications to Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute 
could diminish any negative impact that the Waller decision might 
otherwise have on easement condemnation proceedings, especially 
those for high-voltage transmission lines and for natural gas 
transmission lines.  Making these same modifications to section 
32.05(3m) for quick-take proceedings could also decrease the burden on 
the Wisconsin Department of Transportation in condemning a portion 
of land for a highway project.166 
 
164.  “In a partial takings case, . . . the measure of just compensation is the difference 
between the fair market value of the whole property before the taking and the fair market 
value of the remaining property immediately after the taking.”  Arents, 2005 WI App 61, ¶ 14.  
The difference is referred to as severance damages.  Id.  The combination of these sentences 
is why it makes sense for an uneconomic remnant claim to be brought in a just compensation 
proceeding—a calculation of severance damages is necessary in determining if a financial 
remnant exists. 
165.  See Hoekstra, 2006 WI App 245; see also Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 
77, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764. 
166.  See Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 12, Bailey v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 
2014AP1214 (Wis. App. Apr. 23, 2015), 2014 WL 4783145, at *11 (arguing that, based on the 
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A. Significance of Waller 
While the Waller decision may appear on its face to be a fact-specific 
inquiry that would likely not resurface in future easement condemnation 
proceedings because the Waller property was so small to begin with,167 
the property was already encumbered by easements,168 and the proposed 
easements took up more than half of the property,169 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Waller nevertheless complicate slow-take 
easement condemnation proceedings under section 32.06(3m).170  First, 
Waller has created a new hybrid remnant, which merges language that 
the court concluded referenced financial remnants with language 
intended to apply to physical remnants, thereby creating a new 
classification of remnants that is neither a physical remnant nor a 
financial remnant.171  Second, Waller has established precedent that a 
landowner has the right to bring an uneconomic remnant claim in a 
separate right-to-take proceeding even though both physical remnants 
and financial remnants should be determined based on the value of the 
 
language of Wisconsin Statutes section 32.05(3m), “it is unlikely a change of driveway access 
alone can ever render a property an uneconomic remnant”).  The fact that the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation (DOT) was forced to make this argument on appeal after the 
circuit court judge granted summary judgment in its favor as to whether relocating the 
landowner’s driveway created an uneconomic remnant, id. at 1, 11–12, demonstrates the 
burden that the Waller court’s interpretation of “substantially impaired economic viability” 
may place on the DOT, too.  By creating a hybrid remnant inquiry that requires the court to 
examine whether an entire property is “of substantially impaired economic liability” as a 
result of a partial condemnation, the finder of fact may have a more difficult time determining 
if a remnant exists, and appeals may also become more common.  If, however, uneconomic 
remnant claims were limited to fragmented parcels that were physical remnants or parcels 
that were financial remnants because the severance damages equaled the cost of the entire 
parcel, costly litigation would be avoided, and the landowner would be rightly compensated in 
the form of severance damages.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text.   
167.  The Waller property, before the taking of the easements, was a 1.5 acre triangular 
lot.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 11. 
168.  The Waller property, before the taking of the easements, was already encumbered 
with a twenty-foot transmission line easement on one side of the property, and the property 
was “subject to highway setbacks.”  Id. ¶ 12.  
169.  Both appraisers concluded that the easements would cover more than half the 
property.  Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.  
170.  Specifically, slow-take proceedings for high-voltage transmission lines and natural 
gas lines that are likely to decrease the value of the property could be affected by this new 
hybrid remnant.  See id. ¶ 125 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[C]ondemnors may now be required 
to take an increased amount of property that they do not want or need for their projects.  
Increased costs to ratepayers and taxpayers will accompany these unnecessary takings 
because now condemnors can be required to pay for the entire property, together with 
relocation benefits, rather than paying for the taking of only an easement.”). 
171.  See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
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remainder, which would normally be determined in a just compensation 
hearing.172  Third, by interpreting Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant 
statute in an easement condemnation proceeding—where the 
devaluation of property was partially due to the public’s perceived 
dangers of high-voltage transmission line easements—landowners now 
may require utility companies to take fee simple title to their entire 
property instead of just collecting severance damages by successfully 
arguing that the power lines “substantially impair the economic viability 
of their property,” even when the property is not fragmented by the 
easements and the severance damages do not equal the cost of acquiring 
the entire parcel.173 
B. Three Proposed Modifications to Wisconsin’s  
Uneconomic Remnant Statute 
Given the lack of precedent nationwide regarding uneconomic 
remnants in the context of easement condemnations,174 and the fact that 
Waller has broadened remnant theory to apply to situations that create 
neither physical remnants nor financial remnants,175 the Wisconsin 
legislature should consider three modifications to its uneconomic 
remnant statute to ensure that Waller does not lead to abusive litigation 
in easement condemnation proceedings.  These modifications include 
(1) clearly defining the type of remnant to which “substantially impaired 
economic viability” refers, (2) clarifying that the remedy for devaluation 
of property when neither a physical remnants nor a financial remnant 
exists is severance damages, and (3) expressly overruling one holding in 
Waller by stating that any uneconomic remnant claim is proper only in a 
just compensation hearing, not in a separate right-to-take proceeding. 
 
172.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 118 (majority opinion) (holding that “the ‘right-to-take’ 
provision sets out the proper and exclusive way for a property owner to raise a claim that the 
owner will be left with an uneconomic remnant after a partial taking by the condemnor”); see 
also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the court’s rationale for allowing an uneconomic remnant 
claim to be brought in a separate “right-to-take” action).  But see infra Part VI.B.3 (discussing 
why a valuation proceeding would properly decide whether a physical remnant or a financial 
remnant exists); see also supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
173.  See Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 119 (holding that “the Wallers’ property, after ATC took 
two easements for transmission lines, is an uneconomic remnant because it is of such size, 
shape, and condition as to be of substantially impaired economic viability as either a 
residential or an industrial parcel”); see also Part V (discussing why the Wallers’ property was 
not a physical remnant or a financial remnant and why the proper remedy for devaluation of 
property where neither type of remnant is created is severance damages). 
174.  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
175.  See supra Parts IV–V. 
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1. Eliminate the Ambiguity of “Substantially Impaired Economic 
Viability” 
Section 32.06(3m) should be modified to limit uneconomic remnant 
claims to physical remnants and financial remnants either by replacing 
“substantially impaired economic viability” with the exact language it 
replaced from section 208 of the Model Code176 or by drafting similar 
language requiring that severance damages equal the value of the 
property in order for the uneconomic remnant statute to be applicable, 
unless of course a severed parcel is a physical remnant.  Either of these 
modifications would eliminate the confusing hybrid remnant created by 
the Waller interpretation and application of “substantially impaired 
economic viability.”177  A court simply would have to consider two 
questions: (1) Did the condemnation create a fragmented physical 
remnant that is of little value?  (2) Did the condemnation result in 
severance damages that equaled the value of the entire property?  If the 
answer to both questions were no, then an uneconomic remnant would 
not exist.178  This would prevent courts from continuing to merge the 
language regarding financial remnants with the language regarding 
physical remnants and applying this interpretation in cases where 
neither a physical remnant nor a financial remnant exists, like in 
Waller.179  
Alternatively, the Wisconsin legislature could determine that 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute should not apply to financial 
remnants.180  The legislature could do this either by redefining 
 
176.  The exact language from the Model Code regarding financial remnants that could 
replace “substantially impaired economic viability” is as follows: “[O]r that gives rise to a 
substantial risk that the condemnor will be required to pay in compensation for the part taken 
an amount substantially equivalent to the amount that would be required to be paid if it and 
the remainder were taken as a whole.”  MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22 
(1974).  This is the language that the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that “substantially 
impaired economic viability” was a “more succinct” version of.  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 75; see 
also supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
177.  See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
178.  This is a much more black-and-white inquiry than Waller’s totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
179.  See supra Parts III–V.   
180.  Because many state statutes authorizing the acquisition of uneconomic remnants 
do not address financial remnants, Wisconsin could consider modifying its language to reflect 
the language of statutes that authorize only the acquisition of physical remnants.  This 
modification would mean requiring the remaining portion of the land after the partial taking 
to be of a “little or no value.”  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(9) (2003); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 113-5(9) (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.54(8) (West 2010); ME. 
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“substantially impaired economic viability” as part of the definition of 
physical remnants or by completely eliminating the phrase from the 
statute.  However, the first alternative would mean concluding that the 
phrase was not intended to be a more “succinct” version of the Model 
Code language it replaced,181 and the second would clearly conflict with 
legislative intent that the phrase be included in the statute.182 
2. Acknowledge that Severance Damages Are the Proper Remedy for 
Devaluation of Property When Neither a Physical Remnant Nor a 
Financial Remnant Is Created 
Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute should also be modified to 
clarify that easement condemnation proceedings, which do not create 
physical remnants or financial remnants, are governed by Wisconsin 
Statutes section 32.09(6g), which provides severance damages as the 
remedy for the devaluation of property in an easement condemnation 
proceeding.183  Such a provision would eliminate the confusion created 
by Waller’s application of the statute in a high-voltage transmission line 
easement condemnation.  As Part V explained, because Wisconsin law 
already provides for severance damages as a remedy for devaluation of 
property in an easement condemnation, even if the devaluation is 
partially due to the “fear and stigma” of the easement, the landowner 
still has a proper remedy.184  This provision would eliminate the concern 
that a high-voltage transmission line easement or a natural gas line 
easement would require a fee simple taking of the entire property when 
the property is not fragmented into multiple parcels and the severance 
damages do not equal the cost of acquiring the entire property.  
3. Provide that a Just Compensation Hearing Is the Proper Way to 
Determine Whether a Physical or Financial Remnant Exists 
Finally, the Wisconsin legislature should include a provision that in 
circumstances where the existence of a physical remnant or a financial 
remnant is questionable the claim should be brought in a just 
 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 154-C (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-37-3(i) (2009); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 40A-7(a) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.59(K) (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 13(9) (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-118(a) (2011); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 8.26.180(9) (West 2007). 
181.  But see supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
182.  See supra note 116–17 and accompanying text. 
183.  See WIS. STAT. § 32.09(6g) (2013–2014). 
184.  See supra Part V.C. 
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compensation hearing instead of in a separate right-to-take action.  The 
reason for this provision is quite simply that any determination of a 
physical remnant or a financial remnant should be based solely on the 
before and after valuation of the portion of property not taken in the 
condemnation proceeding.  For a physical remnant to exist, the leftover 
portion would have to be of “little value.”  Thus, if a parcel of a property 
were severed in a condemnation proceeding, the value of the parcel 
would need to be determined to conclude that it is a physical remnant. 
Likewise, a financial remnant would require the severance damages 
to be equal to the value of taking the entire property.  Such a 
determination could be made only after determining the total amount of 
severance damages, which would be validated in a just compensation 
hearing.  The only reason the Waller court was able to conclude that an 
uneconomic remnant claim should precede any just compensation claim 
is because the court created a new classification of remnant that is not a 
physical remnant or a financial remnant.185  Therefore, if Wisconsin’s 
uneconomic remnant statute were modified to be applicable only to 
physical remnants and financial remnants, it would be impractical for a 
landowner to bring an uneconomic remnant claim in a right-to-take 
action because the court would not properly be able to determine if 
either type of remnant exists without a proper valuation of the portion 
of the property in question. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: CHOICE BETWEEN HYBRID OR TRADITIONAL 
REMNANT THEORY 
In an amicus brief in Waller v. American Transmission Co., the 
Wisconsin Utilities Association (WUA) did not focus on whether the 
Waller property truly was an uneconomic remnant but instead argued 
that it is in the public’s interest to require that a such a claim be brought 
in a valuation proceeding, not a separate right-to-take action.186  WUA 
reasoned that a valuation hearing would avoid the “extreme 
inefficiency, delay, and additional expenses created by resolving an 
uneconomic remnant claim in a [separate] right-to-take proceeding.”187  
WUA noted that its utility members “depend on efficient condemnation 
procedures to allow them to quickly construct new power lines, gas 
 
185.  See Parts IV.B–C. 
186.  Wisconsin Utilities Ass’n, Inc.’s Amicus Brief at 7, Waller v. Am. Transmission 
Co., 2013 WI 77 (Nos. 2012AP805 & 2012AP840), 2013 WL 1456756. 
187.  Id. at 15. 
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pipes, and water pipes to meet Wisconsin’s growing utility needs.”188  
Furthermore, increased financial expenses related to eminent domain 
proceedings “directly impact Wisconsin residents, as the costs of doing 
business as a utility are largely passed on to customers through rates.”189 
Within weeks after the Waller decision was issued, the Wisconsin 
legal community was already taking note.190  Some commentary simply 
laid out the holdings of the case, while other commentary cautioned that 
this decision could affect condemnation proceedings within the state.191  
The critical commentary basically echoed Justice Bradley’s dissent in 
Waller, warning that the decision could have a negative impact on 
taxpayers and electricity ratepayers because utility companies may be 
compelled to pay more to acquire an entire property when only an 
easement is needed in order to avoid costly litigation like in Waller.192  
While the WUA and Justice Bradley’s concerns seem warranted, both 
stop short of recognizing that Waller has created a new hybrid remnant 
that merges the inquiry for physical remnants and financial remnants. 
While this Comment also argued that a valuation preceding would 
be the appropriate vehicle for determining if an easement condemnation 
creates an uneconomic remnant, the suggested modifications I propose 
to Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute are intended to address the 
underlying hybrid remnant concern.  In reflecting on the history of 
remnant theory and the enactment of Wisconsin’s eminent domain 
 
188.  Id. at 11. 
189.  Id. at 12. 
190.  See Timothy D. Fenner & Steven M. Streck, Condemnation and the Uneconomic 
Remnant, AXLEY (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.axley.com/publication_article/condemnation-
and-the-uneconomic-remnant/, archived at http://perma.cc/6GYN-39D4; Joe Forward, Public 
Utility Loses Takings Case, Court Clarifies “Uneconomic Remnant” Law, ST. BAR WIS. (Aug. 
8, 2013), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/Pages/General-Article.aspx?ArticleID=109
62, archived at http://perma.cc/X5BU-PLNC; Kevin M. Long & Katherine M. Perhach, When 
Taking Part is Taking All: Eminent Domain and Uneconomic Remnants in Wisconsin, 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.quarles.com/condemnation-eminent-
domain-2013/, archived at http://perma.cc/3PHA-TNQ4; Cari Anne Renlund, Is Supreme 
Court Victory for Property Owners a Loss for Ratepayers and the Public?, DEWITTT ROSS & 
STEVENS S.C. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.dewittross.com/news-education/posts/2013/08/01/is-
supreme-court-victory-for-property-owners-a-loss-for-ratepayers-and-the-public-, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BW36-3BJC. 
191.  Compare Forward, supra note 190, and Long & Perhach, supra note 190, with 
Fenner & Streck, supra note 190, and Renlund, supra note 190. 
192.  See Fenner & Streck, supra note 190; Renlund, supra note 190; see also Waller v. 
Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶¶ 123–125, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764 (Bradley, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the potential negative impacts of the Waller decision on easement 
condemnation proceedings in Wisconsin).  
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statute in 1977, the irony is that financial remnant theory was originally 
advanced to decrease the burden on the government in eminent domain 
proceedings, not to increase the administrative and financial expense 
associated with public projects.  While the court in Public Works 
allowed the California Department of Public Works to acquire a 
landlocked parcel to avoid paying excessive severance damages under 
financial remnant theory,193 the court in Waller interpreted 
“substantially impaired economic viability” in section 32.06(3m) as a 
more succinct version of financial remnant language in the Model Code 
but then applied it as a broader version of physical remnant theory.194  In 
doing so, the burden on ATC in condemning an easement for high-
transmission power lines actually was increased.  
Because Wisconsin law already provides severance damages as the 
proper remedy for devaluation of property due to the “fear and stigma” 
of the easement,195 landowners will still be justly compensated in 
easement condemnations for high-voltage power lines and natural gas 
transmission lines.  At the same time, condemning agencies will not 
have to worry about creating an uneconomic remnant and, therefore, 
paying for more property than is needed when the property is not 
fragmented by the condemnation and the severance damages do not 
equal the cost of acquiring the entire parcel.  Moreover, if Wisconsin 
courts have to continue to rely on Waller, then the courts will be asked 
to interpret “substantially impaired economic viability” on a case-by-
case basis in future easement condemnation proceedings instead of 
simply determining the before-and-after value of the remaining property 
and concluding whether a physical remnant or financial remnant exists.  
Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) projects could also be 
delayed and unduly burdened because the courts will be asked to 
 
193.  People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Superior Court, 436 P.2d 342, 344–45 (Cal. 
1968). 
194.  The majority in Waller determined that the “broader definition [of ‘substantially 
impaired economic viability’] allows for the conclusion that the Wallers’ property constitutes 
an uneconomic remnant even though it is not valueless.”  Waller, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 103.  
However, as this Comment argued, the “little value” language in section 32.06(3m) was 
intended to apply to physical remnants, and the Waller court had already determined that 
“substantially impaired economic viability” equaled language from the Model Code regarding 
financial remnants.  Therefore, the inquiries should not have been combined. 
195.  See Hoekstra v. Guardian Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245 ¶¶ 23–24, 298 Wis. 2d 
165, 726 N.W.2d 648 (discussing the “fear and stigma” of natural gas transmission pipelines). 
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interpret “substantially impaired economic viability” in all quick-take 
proceedings as well under Wisconsin Statutes section 32.05(3m).196 
However, this confusion as to when a property is considered to be 
“of substantially impaired economic viability” could be avoided if three 
modifications were made to Wisconsin’s uneconomic remnant statute.  
These modifications would ultimately clarify exactly what an 
uneconomic remnant is: (1) a remaining fragmented parcel of little 
value, or (2) a remaining parcel where the severance damages equal the 
cost of acquiring the entire property.  The State interest in advancing 
the public good would also be promoted by decreasing the 
administrative and financial burden that the DOT and utility companies 
face in eminent domain proceedings.  
SAMUEL A. MAGNUSON* 
 
196.  A case recently affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals illustrates the impact 
of the substantially impaired economic viability inquiry in the context of a DOT eminent 
domain proceeding.  See Bailey v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 2014AP1214, 2015 WL 1824151 
at *12 (Wis. App. Apr. 23, 2015) (per curiam).  While the issue on appeal was whether 
summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the DOT in a controlled access highway 
case, the circuit court judge’s framing of the uneconomic remnant inquiry is worth observing.  
See Brief of Appellant with Attached Appendix at 9–10, Bailey v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 
2014AP1214 (Wis. App. Apr. 23, 2015), 2014 WL 4545975, at *6. 
The Court believes that for access to a controlled access highway to become 
unreasonable, the standard is related to the uneconomic remnant.  The inquiry is 
whether or not the new access . . . creates a parcel of property that is of a 
substantially impaired economic viability.  If the answer is yes, the access is 
unreasonable and the condemnor must take the entire property. 
Id. at 9.  While the circuit court judge did not find that any evidence in the record created an 
issue of material fact that the landowner’s parcel was “of little value or substantially impaired 
economic viability,” id., the judge’s framing of the issue in the case demonstrates that the 
Waller hybrid remnant no longer may limit uneconomic remnant claims in transportation 
project condemnations to physical remnants (i.e., a small parcel of little value) and financial 
remnants (i.e., where the severance damages would equal the cost of acquiring the entire 
property). 
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